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Abstract Climate change poses a serious global challenge in the face of rapidly increasing human
demand for energy and food. A recent phenomenon in which climate change may play an important role
is the acquisition of large tracts of land in the developing world by governments and corporations. In the
target countries, where land is relatively inexpensive, the potential to increase crop yields is generally
high and property rights are often poorly deﬁned. By acquiring land, investors can realize large proﬁts and
countries can substantially alter the land and water resources under their control, thereby changing their
outlook for meeting future demand. While the drivers, actors, and impacts involved with land deals have
received substantial attention in the literature, we propose that climate change plays an important yet
underappreciated role, both through its direct eﬀects on agricultural production and through its inﬂuence
on mitigative or adaptive policy decisions. Drawing from various literature sources as well as a new global
database on reported land deals, we trace the evolution of the global land rush and highlight prominent
examples in which the role of climate change is evident. We ﬁnd that climate change—both historical
and anticipated—interacts substantially with drivers of land acquisitions, having important implications
for the resilience of communities in targeted areas. As a result of this synthesis, we ultimately contend
that considerations of climate change should be integrated into future policy decisions relating to the
large-scale land acquisitions.
1. Introduction
The global demand for land has steadily increased over the past 50 years [FAO, 2014]. Population growth,
changing diets, and increasing biofuel use are placing unprecedented pressure on the global food system
[Cohen, 1995; Godfray et al., 2010a; Foley et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2014b] while climate change threatens
agricultural production in many regions [Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007; Wheeler and von Braun, 2013].
Many governments and corporations have become increasingly active in the purchase of land in response
to this uncertainty, recognizing the limitation of the agricultural system, the need to reduce greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions, the growing demand for energy and food, and the susceptibility of agricultural yields
to climate ﬂuctuations [Klare, 2012].
At the start of this century, peaking oil production and concerns over energy security and GHG emissions
spurred a more than sixfold increase in the production of crop-based biofuels [OECD/FAO, 2014]. Within
a decade, growth of the agrofuel sector increased competition between food and fuel for cropland and,
in turn, contributed substantially to higher food prices and a more volatile commodity market vulnerable
to climate ﬂuctuations [von Braun et al., 2008; Hochman et al., 2012, 2014]. The vulnerability of the global
food market culminated in 2008 when droughts in major producer countries were followed by spikes
in world food prices (Figure 1) [IMF, 2008; Beddington, 2010; Godfray et al., 2010b]. To curb the domestic
escalation in food prices, some governments went so far as to ban grain exports, much to the concern of
import-dependent countries [Fader et al., 2013]. It thus became clear that food security was at risk in many
importing countries and that the adequacy of resources for long-term food and energy security required
redeﬁnition. At ﬁrst, many import-reliant countries tried to negotiate long-term contracts for supplies of
major grains [Brown, 2012]. Finding this option largely unsuccessful, governments and corporations then
began acquiring rights to land in the global South [Cotula et al., 2009], as part of a phenomenon often
referred to in academia and the popular media as “land grabbing” [Cotula et al., 2009; The Economist, 2009;
Rulli et al., 2013].
Taken together, land for food, fuel, or forests is available only in ﬁnite amounts anddemand for it is expected
to increase in the decades to come. Given this situation, the corporate world has realized the prospects for
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Figure 1. Timeline of land acquisitions and food prices. Major events that have contributed to the global land rush are highlighted. Food
prices are normalized to January 2000 values. Time series of land acquisitions represents the number of deals involving food crops,
biofuel crops, and forestry products and is based on data from LandMatrix [2015]. Evidence relating social unrest to food prices came
from Lagi et al. [2011] and Barrett [2013].
proﬁtable investments in agricultural land. As evidencedby the fact thatmany areas are not actively used for
production once acquired, many land deals also appear to bemerely speculative in the hopes that the land
will becomemore valuable as demand rises [Deininger andByerlee, 2011; Brown, 2012]. Overall, the potential
for proﬁt has frequently led to the treatment of land as a commodity, which can prioritize a purely economic
focus and in turn downplay the potential impacts on local populations (e.g., lost livelihoods, food insecu-
rity) and the environment (e.g., soil erosion, deforestation) [Cotula et al., 2009; von Braun andMeinzen-Dick,
2009; Borras et al., 2010; Messerli et al., 2013; D’Odorico and Rulli, 2014]. While proponents of land invest-
ments often argue that large-scale land acquisitions will bring economic development, energy security,
and improved crop production in underperforming agricultural land, many times the resources acquired
through land deals are no longer available in, or are removed from, the targeted areas [Cotula et al., 2009]
and exported for sale elsewhere [von Braun andMeinzen-Dick, 2009; Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen, 2010;
Brown, 2012]. Therefore the process can often entail the displacement of small-hold farmers or the exclusion
of previous users from access to the land (see Deininger and Byerlee [2011]). However, in some cases there
might be positive outcomes, as the suite of beneﬁts and impacts is unique to each land deal and can diﬀer
between local and national scales [Lisk, 2013].
Climate change may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the global land rush, although its role has been largely unrec-
ognized. We hypothesize that climate change aﬀects land acquisition in two important ways (Figure 2).
First, many governments have enacted regulations in response to the current and anticipated impacts of
GHG emissions on global climate and in turn on the global economy. Through carbon credit mechanisms
(e.g., Kyoto Protocol, Clean Development Mechanism, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation—REDD+) and renewable energymandates (e.g., US Renewable Fuel Standard, EU Renewable
Energy Directive), land-intensive policies appear to have heightened the demand for land. Second, climate
extremes have recently impacted agricultural production in many regions of the world [IPCC, 2014], con-
tributing to higher food prices, and raising concerns over food and energy security. Here we evaluate our
contention that the inﬂuence of climate change is important by more closely examining how and to what
extent it is interwoven with the various aspects surrounding large-scale land acquisitions.
Given the recent acceleration in land acquisitions and the emerging evidence of climate impacts now and
in the near future, our synthesis comes at a crossroads when many countries are faced with the decision
of how reliant they want to be on foreign resources in the future and how best to prepare in turn. Our aim
here is not to provide a comprehensive account of the complex phenomenon of the global land rush (see
Deininger [2013]) rather to present representative examples of where and how climate plays a role in shap-
ing the drivers, actors, and impacts of the ongoing acquisition of land.We argue that by increasing concerns
over energy security, food security, and the impacts of continuedGHGemissions, climate changeexerts sub-
stantial inﬂuence in themotivation for land investments and that the heightened demand for land that has
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Figure 2. Conceptual framework of the drivers, actors, and impacts associated with land acquisitions. Climate change already has
detectable inﬂuences on crop yields, food prices, and food and energy security. Agriculture and the world socioeconomy as well
contribute substantially to climate change through GHG emissions from land use change, transport, industry, and energy production.
Policy is ultimately the response to changes in climate, agricultural production, and the world economy and ideally seeks to minimize the
former while maximizing the latter two. All these drivers act to inﬂuence the decisions of actors (i.e., where, when, and how they invest in
land acquisitions). These decisions may be taken in reaction to a change in one of the drivers (e.g., domestic crop failures) or in
anticipation of a change (e.g., projections of decreased precipitation domestically) depending on the goals and resources of the
governing body or institution. Positive and negative eﬀects of land acquisitions listed here are a suite of potential impacts, the actual
occurrence of which is unique to each land acquisition.
emerged has created a situation in which (inter-)national economic beneﬁts often trump local human wel-
fare andenvironmental stewardship. In support of our argument,weﬁrst highlight the sources andmethods
used in constructing this synthesis. Following this,weexamine the role of climate change in inﬂuencing land
deals for biofuel crops and carbon credit markets in response to recent “green” energy and climate mitiga-
tion policies. We then consider the direct impacts of climate (both historical and anticipated) on staple food
crops and how concerns over future food security may heighten demand for land. After brieﬂy examining
the possible climate feedbacks of land deals (e.g., CO2 emissions from land use change), we consider the
potential impacts of land acquisitions on local communities and the environment and how these dealsmay
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Table 1. Summary of Reported Land Acquisitions by Target Regiona
Africa Asia and Oceania South America Europe Total
Acquired land (Mha) 23.6 14.0 5.1 5.3 48.1
% under production 3 20 29 26 13
% from foreign investors 89 72 76 65 80
Acquired land for biofuelsb(Mha) 5.0 3.4 0.6 0.3 9.3
% under production 4 42 31 5 82
% from foreign investors 91 71 57 31 79
aValues are derived from the Land Matrix [2015] data.
bThe land acquired for biofuels (9.3Mha) is part of the total acquired land (48.1Mha).
alter the vulnerability of targeted areas to future climate change. Finally, we conclude by highlighting the
remaining research needs for land acquisitions and contend that future land policies should give greater
consideration to the inﬂuence of climate while better integrating the needs of local communities.
2. Supporting Literature and Analyses
Large-scale land acquisitions have received much attention in the media and the social science literature
as a result of their social and environmental impacts. However, this phenomenon is generally diﬃcult to
quantify given not only how recently these land deals started to occur but also the lack of transparency in
many of the negotiations. Though not always the case, land deals are many times characterized by little
or no prior informed consent from previous land users as well as a lack of enforcement and monitoring of
existing protective legislation [Deininger and Byerlee, 2011; Deininger, 2013; D’Odorico and Rulli, 2014]. The
dearth of information on land deals is whymany previous studies have focused solely on the extent of area
aﬀected or land acquired. To date, roughly 48 million hectares (ha) are estimated to be under international
and domestic contracts (Table 1), withmanymore acquisitions currently in progress and under negotiation
[LandMatrix, 2015]. Also though this area is small (3.1%) in comparison to the extent of total land cultivated
globally, these acquisitions—concentrated mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia—have sub-
stantially increased the amount of land and water resources under the control of certain countries and the
corporations based in them (e.g., Saudi Arabia, South Korea, UK) [Toft, 2013; LandMatrix, 2015].
Land rush scholars have also started to account for aspects other than areal extent, including the negotia-
tion and implementation stage of each land deal, the type of land use, and the appropriation of water and
other land-based resources [Rulli and D’Odorico, 2013] as well as the potential impacts on incomes [Davis
et al., 2014a] and diets [Rulli and D’Odorico, 2014] of local communities. Many of these more in-depth anal-
yses have been possible with the emergence of new databases. One such publicly available database is
the Land Matrix [2015], which has catalogued detailed information on reported large-scale land acquisi-
tions including area, location, negotiation status, contract date, investor company and country of origin,
and intended use. The development of this database faces some challenges because of the diﬃculty in
maintaining an accurate and up-to-date data set, potential bias toward foreign investments only due to
including deals larger than 200 ha, and diﬃculty in on-ground validation and assessment [Anseeuw et al.,
2013; Edelman, 2013; Oya, 2013]. With these shortcomings fully in mind, our examination uses information
from this global database—combined with a rapidly growing land rush literature from the environmental
and social sciences—to place the recent surge in the large-scale land acquisitions into the broader context
of climate and climate change.
3. Land-Intensive Climate Policies as Drivers of Acquisitions
Fossil fuel consumption and land-use change are two major sources of anthropogenic CO2 emissions con-
tributing to climate change. It has been estimated that about 70% of global GHG emissions are contributed
by a combination of the energy, transport, and industry sectors as well as land use change (e.g., forest con-
version, peat ﬁres) [IPCC, 2014]. In an eﬀort to promote environmental protection [Phelps et al., 2012] and to
ensure energy security, certain countries have adopted policies intending to preserve native forests for car-
bon storage ormandating a certain reliance on agrofuels.Many of these policies are “land-intensive” as they
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require large areas to have an important eﬀect. Seeking to beneﬁt from such programs, some governments
and investors have found it more economical to acquire lands in the developing world to achieve reduc-
tions in emissions [Phelps et al., 2010]. Recent examples of these “green” acquisitions include land deals for
oil palm and carbon sequestration in Indonesia’s Outer Islands [McCarthy et al., 2012] and the establishment
of carbon-oﬀset tree plantations in Uganda [Lyons andWestoby, 2014]. In turn, an unintended yet frequent
consequence of these emissions-curbing policies is to promote acquisitions that restrict the access to and
use of the land by reliant local communities [Fairhead et al., 2012]. Generally, there exist two main avenues
through which environmental land acquisitions (i.e., acquisitions for environmental ends [Fairhead et al.,
2012]) can occur: (1) from the establishment of carbon credit markets [Meyfroidt et al., 2013] and (2) from
increasing biofuel demand [Kim et al., 2009].
3.1. Land Acquisitions for Carbon Storage
In carbon credit markets, a company is permitted to emit more GHG domestically if it invests in carbon
reduction projects either domestically or abroad, eﬀectively acting as an oﬀset. Often, such an approach
can be more cost-eﬀective for a company than making process upgrades to their production, and thus
incentivizes participation in the carbon market [Meyfroidt et al., 2013]. Just as in any market-based system,
speculators have the opportunity to purchase large tracts of land inexpensively and sell them for proﬁt to
investment funds assembling carbon reduction projects [Fairhead et al., 2012]. The appropriation and com-
modiﬁcation of land for carbon credit markets (or other projects with environmental credentials) is often
termed “green grabbing” [Fairhead et al., 2012]. Though part of a system with explicit environmental goals,
“green” land acquisitions can contribute to a disconnect between investors who acquire the land rights and
the local populations and ecosystems that such investments may unwittingly harm. While the extent of
current acquisitions for carbon storage remains unclear, Fairhead et al. [2012] suggest that the substantial
ﬁnancial backing for carbonmarkets—now in the billions of dollars [World Bank, 2010]—may spur a ﬂurry
of land deals related to carbon oﬀsetting. It is therefore important thatmechanisms put in place to facilitate
the buying and selling of carbon credits are aware of such unintended consequences for communities and
the environment and take steps to prevent their occurrence. However, the often multilateral nature of car-
bonmarkets canmake it diﬃcult (if not impossible) to incorporate suﬃciently strict and speciﬁc regulations
into policy.
With thegoal of conserving forests andmaintaining their capacity for carbon storage, theREDD+ is just such
a mechanism, that is based on the implementation of carbon markets and that has received widespread
attention and criticism. One of the concerns with the mechanism surrounds certain decisions taken at the
most recent United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) tasked with advancing
theREDD+ agenda. There the role of deﬁningwhat a “forest” is and towhomtheembedded carbonbelongs
was largely left to each country to decide [UNFCCC, 2013]. Given the many vested interests in and impli-
cations of land use policy and forest conservation, carbon credit and conservation policies may therefore
take on diﬀerent forms from country to country to include not only native forests but also possibly tree
plantations and monocultures [UNFCCC, 2006]. The deﬁnition adopted by each country will have impor-
tant implications for all of its stakeholders as well as its carbon storage potential [Fargione et al., 2008]. In
any case, recent multi-country studies of REDD+ pilot programs (see Larson et al. [2013]) have shown that
the marginalization of local and indigenous land rights is a common if not ubiquitous occurrence and that
the topic of traditional land rights under REDD+ has been largely absent from the public and political dis-
course. Though limited thus far in its implementation (partly because the greater proﬁtability of oilcrops
[e.g., oil palm] can incentivize other land uses [Butler et al., 2009]), REDD+ represents a potentially viable
means for conserving forests and reducing emissions due to land use change [Angelsen, 2008]. However, in
light of the potential adverse consequences, what is essential for policy makers to address is that further
forest conservation for carbon reduction projects can lead to potential changes in land tenure and, in turn,
act as a conduit for impacting the livelihoods of local people (Figure 2).
3.2. Land Demand of Crop-Based Biofuels
The use of crop-based fuels is one of the most widely adopted practices in attempting to address GHG
emissions and climate change. Land deals intended for biofuel production constitute 19% of the interna-
tional concluded acquisitions (Table 1) [Deininger and Byerlee, 2011; LandMatrix, 2015]. Renewable energy
production through hydropower, wind farms, and solar energy is also contributing—though to a lesser
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extent—to “green” land acquisitions [Scheidel andSorman, 2013; LandMatrix, 2015].With fossil fuel produc-
tion expected to decline [Pfeiﬀer, 2006], energy sources that are both renewable and less environmentally
impactful have received serious attention as concern over GHGemissions and energy security has risen. The
production and consumption of crop-based biofuels have increased rapidly since the start of the century,
contributing substantially to increasing food prices (∼30%) [von Braun et al., 2008; Hochman et al., 2012,
2014] and volatility [Searchinger et al., 2008; OECD/FAO, 2014]. The inﬂuence of biofuels is also projected to
continue in the near future, as increasing production (57%–61% over the next decade) [OECD/FAO, 2014]
continues to raise food prices (7%–15%) [OECD/FAO, 2014] and price volatility (see Timilsina and Shrestha
[2010]). However, while growing biofuel demand continues to drive purchases of large tracts of inexpen-
sive land abroad [Scheidel and Sorman, 2013], the future of crop-based fuels—and the accompanying land
investments—remains unclear. The long-term path of agrofuel production is very much subject to pol-
icy changes and likely to decline as the cons of crop-based biofuel production (e.g., competition with food,
lower net carbon savings) havebecomemore apparent and as later generationbiofuel productionbecomes
more aﬀordable.
4. Uncertainty of Future Food Security
Land acquisitions in the name of food security also feature prominently in the global land rush, accounting
for 27% of all concluded land deals to date [Land Matrix, 2015]. While many past agricultural investments
were focused on export-oriented tropical commodities, the ongoing land rush also concentrates on staple
crops [Kugelman and Levenstein, 2012]. The need and opportunity for such investments partly results from
the increased competition with biofuel production, food market volatility [FAO/OECD, 2011] and climate
uncertainty [Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994; Parry et al., 2004; Hatﬁeld et al., 2011; Lobell et al., 2011], especially
after recent food price spikes and widespread sociopolitical instability [Lagi et al., 2011; Barrett, 2013] that
followed climate extremes in major producer countries [IPCC, 2014]. Climate change is also expected to
increase the frequency of extreme climate events [IPCC, 2014] and to at least modestly contribute to ele-
vated foodprices in the future (e.g., Lobell et al. [2011]). In response to a suite of challenges—the current and
anticipated impact of climate on food supply and prices in a world with limited availability of arable land,
rapid population growth, and urbanization—import-reliant countries have become increasingly active in
the acquisition of agricultural land abroad for the purposes of food security [von Braun and Meinzen-Dick,
2009;RobertsonandPinstrup-Andersen, 2010;Brown, 2012]. Theuptick in food-related landdeals is especially
apparent for investments originating from theMiddle East where 82% of all concluded deals have occurred
after the 2008 food crisis, 76% of which are primarily intended for food crops, according to Land Matrix
[2015]. In comparison, globally only 35% of concluded land acquisitions reported in Land Matrix [2015]
were for the expressed intent of food crops over the same time period.
More broadly, certain countries from which investments originate have already substantially increased the
amount of land under their control [Rulli et al., 2013] whether for biofuels, food, or another purpose. By
combining information on cultivated land [FAO, 2014] with Land Matrix [2015] estimates of acquired area,
it is possible to identify which countries potentially beneﬁt from such land deals. These countries include
Malaysia (with a 69% “virtual” increase over its 2010 cultivated land), the UK (38%), Saudi Arabia (178%), and
South Korea (76%) as well as several Middle Eastern countries (>250%). Those investing governments are
fromboth the global North and Southmake apparent the fact that the global land rush does not necessarily
follow the historical paradigm of resources ﬂowing from South to North [Margulis et al., 2013]. Furthermore
as a result of some land transactions, targeted countries are potentially experiencing signiﬁcant reductions
in the cultivated land available to them. In the event that future climate change signiﬁcantly impacts crop
yields in these target countries, they may require greater agricultural area to maintain production levels.
Contracting large tracts of cultivatable land out to investors thus eﬀectively reduces the resilience of tar-
geted areas to future climate shocks and can potentially leave them more dependent on imported—and
likely higher priced—food commodities. In Gabon, 0.47 million ha are reported to have been contracted
out to domestic and foreign investors [Land Matrix, 2015], an area equivalent to 95% of the country’s area
of arable and permanent crop land [FAO, 2014]. Also, Liberia has reportedly leased 1.80million ha of its land
[LandMatrix, 2015], roughly three times as much as the country’s current arable and permanent crop land
[FAO, 2014] (see Table 2). In presenting information on how a country can potentially change the amount of
land under its control, we should note that while the eﬀects on the targeted country can be better deﬁned,
DAVIS ET AL. GLOBAL LAND RUSH AND CLIMATE CHANGE 303
Earth’s Future 10.1002/2014EF000281
Table 2. List of Top Targeted Countriesa
Target Country Acquired Area (Mha) Cropland (Mha) % of Cultivated Land
Argentina 1.34 40.29 3
Brazil 1.49 79.61 2
Cambodia 1.55 4.26 36
China 0.65 122.53 1
Colombia 0.58 3.45 17
Congo 2.13 0.60 355
DRC 2.85 7.81 37
Ethiopia 1.25 16.49 8
Gabon 0.47 0.50 96
Ghana 0.91 7.40 12
Guyana 0.81 0.45 180
Indonesia 3.97 45.50 9
Kenya 0.29 6.13 5
Laos 0.50 1.62 31
Liberia 1.80 0.71 254
Madagascar 1.06 4.11 26
Malaysia 2.24 7.46 30
Mali 0.39 7.01 6
Morocco 0.70 9.40 7
Mozambique 2.37 5.95 40
Nigeria 0.70 41.70 2
Papua New Guinea 4.01 1.00 401
Russia 3.22 121.35 3
Senegal 0.28 3.42 8
Sierra Leone 1.48 1.90 78
Sudan and South Sudan 4.86 24.01 20
Tanzania 0.36 16.65 2
Timor Leste 0.45 0.23 194
Ukraine 1.91 33.41 6
Uruguay 0.77 1.80 43
Vietnam 0.30 10.20 3
Zambia 0.47 3.84 12
Zimbabwe 0.39 4.10 10
aA list of target countries that currently account for 95% of total acquired land area. In total, Land Matrix [2015]
reports 75 countries are the targets of large-scale land acquisitions. Cropland is the sum of “Arable land” and “Per-
manent crops” as estimated in FAO [2014]. In cases where the percent of cultivated land is greater than 100%, this is
likely because a country has contracted a large area of previously uncultivated land (e.g., forests, grasslands).
the involvement of multinational corporations can make identifying the beneﬁciaries of such investments
more diﬃcult.
When large-scale land acquisitions occur for crop production, they are generally touted by investors and
governments as a way to bring technological investments [Cotula et al., 2009; von Braun andMeinzen-Dick,
2009; Deininger and Byerlee, 2011; Messerli et al., 2013] to the developing world in order to improve crop
yields and to better ensure economic development and food security. However, many land deals occur
in areas where climate’s impact on crop yields is expected to be particularly pronounced [Wheeler and
von Braun, 2013]. Thus, an important question that remains is how crop yields in targeted areas may
be aﬀected by climate change in the future [Parry et al., 2004; Jaggard et al., 2010; Hatﬁeld et al., 2011].
While there exists limited spatial data sets on land acquisitions, we can infer from national and regional
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Figure 3. Comparison of changes in crop yields due to factors of climate change, CO2 fertilization, and increased yields. In the upper
panel, the eﬀects of climate change with (without) CO2 fertilization are expected to increase (decrease) crop yields in the targeted
regions, based on data fromMüller et al. [2013]. These data agree well with other estimates [Ainsworth andMcGrath, 2010; Jaggard et al.,
2010; IPCC, 2014] of the CO2 eﬀect on future crop yields (∼10%–20% relative yield increase for C3 crops at 550 ppm CO2). The lower
panel shows the potential to increase crop productivity through yield gap closure using conventional technologies (e.g., irrigation,
synthetic fertilizer application) based on data fromMueller et al. [2012]. The data shown represent 75% of the maximum attainable yield.
These values agree well with case studies making estimates of yield gaps in the developing world (see Lobell et al. [2009]).
projections what the net changes in yield may generally be as a result of climate change, CO2 fertil-
ization and yield intensiﬁcation. In the regions most targeted by land deals (Figure 3), climate change
alone is expected to reduce major crop yields (3%–18% decline). When the eﬀects of climate change
are considered in conjunction with CO2 fertilization, all regions experience a positive eﬀect (7%–23%
increase). These changes from climate stress and the CO2 eﬀect are, however, modest in comparison to
the potential changes in crop yields that can occur as a result of improved technology and eﬃciency
[Godfray et al., 2010a; Tilman et al., 2011; Mueller et al., 2012; Rulli and D’Odorico, 2014]. The potential for
intensiﬁcation to markedly improve crop production is most apparent in Africa where relative changes
to major crop yields can exceed 100%. Due in large part to this fact, Africa is the most heavily targeted
continent for land deals [Deininger, 2013] (53% of globally acquired agricultural area and 65% of all food
crop deals, according to LandMatrix [2015] [Figure 4]). Ideally, the inﬂux of technology associatedwith land
acquisitions could help feed and fuel the African continent whose population is expected to double by
mid-century (∼2.4 billion people) and quadruple by century’s end (∼4.2 billion people) [UN-DESA, 2012]. To
date, though, much of the agricultural production is exported and often does not beneﬁt local populations
[Cotula et al., 2009].
5. Supporting Evidence for Climate Feedbacks
It is apparent that climate change (both historical and anticipated) exerts inﬂuence on land purchases
both through its eﬀect on policy decisions and its direct impact on crop production. However, there is also
evidence that large-scale land dealsmay contribute to climate change,most notably through the increased
CO2 emissions associated with land use change and deforestation [Fargione et al., 2008]. For example, land
acquisitions are turning forests into oil palm plantations in Papua New Guinea [Laurance et al., 2012] and in
Indonesia [Carlson et al., 2012], where 7.6 million ha [LandMatrix, 2015] (equivalent to 44% of all harvested
DAVIS ET AL. GLOBAL LAND RUSH AND CLIMATE CHANGE 305
Earth’s Future 10.1002/2014EF000281
Figure 4. Global summary of human and environmental impacts of land appropriation. Comparison of the most targeted regions in
terms of acquired land [LandMatrix, 2015], acquired water [Rulli and D’Odorico, 2013], the number of people who could potentially be
fed by crop production on acquired lands [Rulli and D’Odorico, 2014], and the amount of agricultural income potentially lost by farmers
as a result of changes in land access [Davis et al., 2014a]. We have included Papua New Guinea in Southeast Asia. Also, acquired water
includes both green (i.e., rainwater) and blue (i.e., irrigation) water, assuming irrigated fractions equal to those reported for the host
country [2014Rulli and D’Odorico, 2013]. These estimates are based on large-scale land acquisition data from Land Matrix database [Land
Matrix, 2015] which includes both international and domestic land deals greater than 200 ha in the years after 2000. For each land deal
the Land Matrix reports [Anseeuw et al., 2013] the area, the dominant crop, negotiation state (i.e., concluded or just intended/under
negotiation). Here we considered only signed land deals with a known contract area. The water appropriation associated with these land
acquisitions was calculated by 2014Rulli and D’Odorico [2013] using the CROPWAT 8.0 [FAO, 2009] model, based on the
Penman–Monteith method with crop parameters from Allen et al. [1998], soil properties from the Harmonized World Soil Database
[FAO/IIASA/ISRIC/ISSCAS/JRC, 2012], and meteo data from NOAA [2014]. The crop and food that could be produced by the acquired land
was calculated by Rulli and D’Odorico [2014] using crop types from LandMatrix [2015] and agricultural yields fromMueller et al. [2012].
The study by Davis et al. [2014a] estimates potential lost income assuming the intended crop of the land deal was already grown there
and that crop yields remain the same (i.e., at national average levels).
Indonesian oil palm land [FAO, 2014]) are reportedly under contract from land deals. Any carbon debt
generated by these associated land use changes will take several decades before biofuels can pay it back
[Fargione et al., 2008] and, in the case of non-biofuel crops, will remain as a more permanent impact on the
environment and the global climate. To prevent further deforestation in the name of biofuel production,
European Union policies do not count toward the renewable energy requirements any agrofuels grown
on lands converted from primary forests or woodlands [EU, 2009]. However, commonly observed patterns
of land use change in many target countries involve the displacement of food crops and rangelands by
biofuels and the establishment of new rangelands at the expense of forests [Hermele, 2014]. In turn, such
land conversions can cause a net increase in CO2 emissions as farmers convert natural systems to cropland
in response to higher food prices [Butler et al., 2009; Fargione et al., 2008]. In fact, recent studies in Indonesia
[Lee et al., 2014] and Brazil [Godar et al., 2014] have shown that areas utilized by smallholder farmers can, in
certain cases, exhibit higher deforestation rates than large-scale land acquisitions, despite the latter being
highly capitalized. Such indirect replacements of forests can thereforemake it diﬃcult to track andmonitor
the land use change induced by biofuel production.
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6. Cascading Eﬀects on Societies and the Environment
The avenues by which climate change inﬂuences land acquisitions are through its impacts on agricultural
production and through “land-intensive” programs aimed at its mitigation. But ultimately why the global
land rush as awhole has raised concern is because of its potential impact on people and the environment in
targeted areas (Figure 4). The commercialization of agriculture on acquired lands can oﬀer great beneﬁts for
a target country in terms of increased food supply, economic growth, rural development, and resilience to
climate change. Indeed there have been instances where investors have provided the beneﬁts promised to
local communities (e.g., job creation, assisted relocation) (see Deininger and Byerlee [2011]). However, local
communities frequently see their livelihoods compromised as a result of such deals [D’Odorico and Rulli,
2013], potentially leading to losses in household income [Davis et al., 2014a] and in available food calo-
ries [Rulli and D’Odorico, 2014] as well as land conﬂicts and migrations [Anseeuw et al., 2012; Feldman and
Geisler, 2012; Julia andWhite, 2012; Adnan, 2013; Chinsinga et al., 2013;Hermele, 2014]. Likely environmental
impacts include soil loss and compaction [Soane and van Ouwerkerk, 1994; Lal, 1995; Montgomery, 2008],
elevated runoﬀ [Tilman et al., 2001] and GHG emissions from fertilizers [Tilman et al., 2001] and increased
competition for water resources [Mueller et al., 2012; Rulli et al., 2013]. In addition, the fact that much of the
crop production from land acquisitions will be sent elsewhere also means that consumers will be discon-
nected from these environmental impacts [Meyfroidt et al., 2013] and thus be less aware of the eﬀects of
their choices. However, we should note that though the environmental impacts listed here are generally
associated with a transition to mechanized agriculture, many have yet to be demonstrated speciﬁcally on
acquired land. Also, the extent to which lands acquired for carbon storage and forest conservation actually
preserve forests remains poorly understood. This lack of evidence about the environmental eﬀects of land
acquisitions therefore remains a signiﬁcant knowledge gap in the land rush literature.
This synthesis leads to the conclusion that the acquisitionof landand theexport of the cropsproduced there
mayultimately alter the resilience of countries and communities to climate change. In destination countries,
crops from acquired areas may provide a buﬀer against the adverse eﬀects of climate change and demo-
graphic growth on food security. Nowhere is thismore the case than in theMiddle East—a regionwith little
arable land [FAO, 2014], low potential to further increase crop yields [Mueller et al., 2012], a projected 43%
increase in populationbymid-century [UN-DESA, 2013] and substantial expected impacts of climate change
on agriculture [Müller et al., 2013]. By committing considerable investments toward acquiring African crop-
lands, several Middle Eastern countries have eﬀectively more than doubled the arable land under their
control [FAO, 2014; Land Matrix, 2015]. More generally, the fact that potential yield increases in targeted
areas more than oﬀset climate impacts means that many land deals (especially for food crops) can essen-
tially be thought of as a purchase of resilience to climate change. This exchange of resourcesmay also leave
targeted countries less resilient to climate extremes (e.g., droughts, ﬂoods) [D’Odorico et al., 2010;Wheeler
and von Braun, 2013]. Many of the countries targeted by land investments have low levels of development,
making them less equipped—both ﬁnancially and in terms of infrastructure—to copewith climate shocks.
Many land deals also occur in areas that experience high levels of food insecurity [IFPRI, 2012]. Yet despite
the apparent long-term need for agricultural land in targeted areas, many current policies related to land
acquisitions frequently allow the export of the agricultural goods that were once consumed and sold
locally [Cotula et al., 2009; Anseeuw et al., 2012]. This practice may exacerbate problems of local malnour-
ishment [D’Odorico and Rulli, 2013] and prevent beneﬁts—both ﬁnancial and nutritional—from accruing
locally.
7. Lessons Learned
The role of climate change in the global land rush has been generally unrecognized. In the regions most
targeted by the global land rush, the impacts of climate change are expected to be especially pronounced
(particularly for the poor) as a result of direct economic dependence on agriculture and a lack of infrastruc-
ture [Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007;Wheeler and von Braun, 2013]. Thus the fact that many land deals seek
to promote energy and food security, foster rural development or curb GHG emissions may be viewed as a
means to provide a buﬀer for vulnerable communities against climate change impacts. However, accepting
a large-scale land acquisition carries with it substantial political, social, and environmental implications. It is
therefore important in using land acquisitions as a means to address economic development, global food
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and energy security andGHGemissions that leaders and policy-makers in target countries do not overvalue
short-term gains at the expense of lasting human welfare and environmental stewardship.
The issue of large-scale land acquisitions is a complex one involving various drivers, actors, and impacts.
The general lack of transparency and accountability with which many deals occur only compounds the
complexity. Despite these signiﬁcant challenges, land rush scholars have tried to keep pace with such a
rapidmoving phenomenon. Yet a deeper understanding of several key issues related to land acquisitions is
still needed in order to better inform policy decisions. This is especially true for the linkages between land
acquisitions and climate change, where knowledge continues to be deﬁcient despite ongoing government
and academic research. In particular, it is still unclear whether investments preferentially target areas that
are expected to be least aﬀected by (or to beneﬁt from) climate change. The use of acquired land for biofuel
crops also remains poorly documented with considerable uncertainty regarding to what extent the crops
will be actually used for bioenergy production rather than for food, feed, or other uses. In fact, the global
patterns of biofuel crop production and trade have only recently started to be investigated. Therefore, the
direct and indirect impacts of new bioenergy policies (e.g., in the U.S. and Europe) on land investments in
countries targeted by the land rush are diﬃcult to quantify, and overall, the connections among biofuel
consumers, agribusiness investors, and feedstock producers need to be better understood.
To evaluate the impact on local populations and their livelihoods, it is essential to determine towhat extent
the crops produced on the acquired land remain locally available and how frequently changes in land rights
can result in eviction andmarginalization. Land use change associated with this phenomenon also remains
poorly quantiﬁed. To date information on whether the land was previously cultivated, fallow or forested is
lacking, which prevents a quantitative assessment of the impacts that land acquisitions have on CO2 emis-
sions and climate. Such analyses are strongly limited by the lack of georeferencedmaps of land concessions,
permits, leases, and purchasesmade by large-scale investors in the target countries. Thus, without knowing
the exact location of the acquired land it is diﬃcult to evaluate changes in land use.
Despite these challenges, regional studies on the global land rush have stressed the relationship existing
between land grabbing and bioenergy production (e.g., Naylor [2011]), and highlighted the associated
impacts on rural livelihoods and the environment, including GHG emissions. Thus, new policies need to
be put in place to prevent the increasing demand for agricultural products (including those used for bioen-
ergy) from contributing to large-scale land acquisitions, GHG emissions, and livelihood losses. Preference
should be given to less land-intensive climate policies (other renewables) and improved credit schemes
that include the needs of local communities in the evaluation of REDD+ projects. To date, the international
community has not adopted any eﬀective policy aimed at regulating large-scale land acquisitions and pre-
venting them from contributing to environmental degradation, forced evictions, livelihood losses, and food
insecurity for the local populations. Existingprinciples [FAO/IFAD/UNCTAD/WorldBank, 2010] andguidelines
[FAO, 2011] are only weak instruments for the regulation of large-scale land acquisitions and the protection
of the interests of local communities. In fact, because of their voluntary nature these guidelines are not
enforceable, and compliance with the professional standards indicated therein remains an investor’s deci-
sion. On the other hand, recent energy policies clarify that biofuel produced at the expense of “valuable
ecosystems” [EU, 2009] should not count toward the renewable energy mandates of EU countries. Those
policies, however, remain completely silent on the impacts of such mandates on large-scale land acquisi-
tions. By stressing the linkage existing between climate change and the ongoing land rush, this paper has
highlighted how some of the detrimental eﬀects of this phenomenon are indeed the result of deﬁciencies
in the recent energy policies.
Finally, evidence from this synthesis indicates that acquired lands may ultimately represent a way for an
investing country to improve its resilience to climate change. By controlling agricultural land in diﬀerent
regions, a country essentially diversiﬁes its land holdings and may as a result reduce its susceptibility to
local climate shocks. Given evidence that a growing reliance on trade has left the global food systemmore
vulnerable to perturbations such climate variability [Suweis et al., 2015], large-scale land acquisitions may
therefore represent a mechanism for circumventing participation in a food market of increased prices and
volatility. While the many studies examined here attest to these climate change–land acquisition connec-
tions, further research is still required to determine more conclusively these linkages and to ensure a more
equitable balance between local impacts and global beneﬁts.
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